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1STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Joseph Duane Herrera appeals from his conviction for second degree murder entered
following a second jury trial, for the shooting death of his girlfriend.  Previously in this case,
Mr. Herrera was charged with second degree murder and convicted after a three-day jury trial in
2013.  He was sentenced to life, with twenty-two years fixed.  He appealed, and his conviction
was vacated by the Idaho Supreme Court in 2015.  He was retried, and again convicted of second
degree murder in 2016.  This time, a different sentencing judge sentenced him to life, with thirty
years fixed.
On appeal, Mr. Herrera asserts that the prosecutor vindictively prosecuted him and misled
the district court when it sought to amend the information to add a firearm sentencing
enhancement, and after trial by arguing for an increased sentence based on the dismissed
sentencing enhancement; that the district court erred in failing to provide him with a full and fair
opportunity to explain the conflict he was having with his attorney; that the district court abused
its discretion when it overruled his foundation objections to Detective Berger’s testimony on
gunshot residue analysis because Detective Berger did not have practical experience or special
knowledge that would qualify him as an expert on gunshot residue analysis; and that the
prosecutor committed misconduct during closing arguments.  The accumulation of the errors
deprived him of his right to a fair trial.  Finally, Mr. Herrera asserts that the second sentencing
judge vindictively increased his sentence by eight years fixed.
This Reply Brief is necessary to address the State’s arguments in response, which
are unavailing.
2Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Mr. Herrera’s Appellant’s Brief.  They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are
incorporated herein by reference thereto.
3ISSUES
I. Did the State vindictively prosecute Mr. Herrera by adding a firearm sentencing
enhancement, and did the State commit misconduct when it misled the district court in
order to get its motion to amend the complaint granted?
II. Did the district court err in failing to conduct a sufficient inquiry of Mr. Herrera and his
trial counsel upon Mr. Herrera’s request for substitute counsel?
III. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it overruled Mr. Herrera’s foundation
objections to Detective Berger’s testimony on gunshot residue analysis?
IV. Did the State commit prosecutorial misconduct in its closing arguments?
V. Did the accumulation of errors deprive Mr. Herrera of his right to a fair trial?
VI. Did the district court impose a vindictive sentence after the second trial?
4ARGUMENT
I.
Mr. Herrera’s Right To Due Process Of Law Was Violated By Prosecutorial Vindictiveness
When The Prosecutor Amended The Information To Add A New Sentencing Enhancement And
When He Argued For Its Consideration At Sentencing; The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct
When He Misled The Court As To The Purpose Of The Enhancement1
1. The State’s Request To Amend The Information To Add A Firearm Sentencing
Enhancement Constituted A Vindictive Prosecution Because The Enhancement
Was Only Sought As Punishment For Mr. Herrera Exercising His Due Process
Right To Challenge His Conviction
In the present case, the prosecutor acted maliciously and in bad faith when he brought a
new sentencing enhancement against Mr. Herrera, after the Idaho Supreme Court granted him a
new trial.
The State claims Mr. Herrera’s repeated objections—first to the amendment of the
Information to add a new firearm enhancement, and second to the prosecutor’s use of the now-
dismissed enhancement to support his argument for an additional eight fixed years of
incarceration—did not serve to preserve his argument that the State maliciously prosecuted him
after  he  exercised  his  constitutional  rights.   (Resp.  Br.,  pp.4-5.)   The  record  belies  the
State’s claim.
The State filed a motion to amend the Information to add a sentencing enhancement for
using a firearm during the commission of second degree murder.2  (Limited R., pp.58-62.)
1 Mr. Herrera relies on his initial arguments made in the Appellant’s Brief that the prosecutor
committed misconduct when it misled the district court to grant the amendment but then urged
the court to increase Mr. Herrera’s sentence based on the now-dismissed enhancement.  (App.
Br., pp.20-24.)
2 As  discussed  in  the  Appellant’s  Brief,  there  was  no new firearm that could constitute newly
discovered evidence which would have justified the prosecution seeking to add an additional
firearm sentencing enhancement because the gun had been turned over to law enforcement on the
day of the shooting.  (See App. Br., p.14.)
5Mr. Herrera objected and a hearing was held on plaintiff’s motion to amend the Information to
include a firearm enhancement.  (Tr. (Vol. I), p.32, L.14 – p.41, L.11.)
At the hearing, the prosecutor, apparently recognizing that his motion to amend could be
construed as a vindictive prosecution, said “It certainly isn’t any personal vindictiveness that I
would have and -- over the reasons for amending the information.”  (Tr. (Vol. I), p.34, Ls.3-9.)
Defense counsel’s objection and argument that the proposed amendment infringed upon
Mr. Herrera’s constitutional rights where “now he is facing a greater penalty than he would if he
is convicted of the offense that he had already been tried for” (Tr. (Vol. I), p.36, L.10 – p.37,
L.24), further preserved the objection for vindictive prosecution for appellate review.   Also, the
prosecutor referenced a Court of Appeals case addressing the presumption of vindictiveness.
(Tr. (Vol. I), p.38, L.19 – p.39, L.9.)  The district court then acknowledged the case, saying that
it did not think “the fact that the prosecuting attorney is new is the be-all end-all as far as
vindictiveness,” and said that it had previously researched the issue of vindictiveness and it
wanted to go back and look at that research, then it would issue a decision.  (Tr. (Vol. I), p.39,
L.16 – p.40, L.11.)  The court then issued a written decision in which it granted the State’s
motion, finding the amendment could not possibly result in an increased penalty.3  (Limited
R., pp.96-105.)
3 While the district court relied on a case from another jurisdiction in recognizing that the
analysis was the same for either a sentencing enhancement or a new charge in a claim of
prosecutorial vindictiveness (see State v. Patterson, 637 S.W.2d 16 (Mo. 1982)), the district
court primarily focused its in-depth analysis on a non-final Idaho Court of Appeals decision,
State v. Ostler, 2015 Opinion No. 42335 (Dec. 8, 2015).  (Limited R., pp.101-104.)  Prior to the
district court’s decision on March 23, 2016, the Idaho Supreme Court had granted the
respondent’s petition for review in Ostler on February 11, 2016.  The Idaho Supreme Court
issued its Opinion affirming the judgment of conviction on November 2, 2016; therefore, the
Court of Appeals’ decision is no longer current law. See State v. Ostler, 161 Idaho 350 (2016).
6Even assuming that appellate review required Mr. Herrera to object and voice the specific
words, “prosecutorial vindictiveness,” the error is still preserved because it was specifically
addressed by the court.  The Idaho Supreme Court’s Opinion in State v. DuValt, 131 Idaho 550
(1998), is instructive:
Preliminarily, we note that the State argues that this issue may not be raised on
appeal because it was not raised to the trial court. This Court has held that
ordinarily issues cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. Sandpoint
Convalescent Servs. Inc. v. Idaho Dep't of Health & Welfare, 114 Idaho 281, 284
(1988). An exception to this rule, however, has been applied by this Court when
the issue was argued to or decided by the trial court. Northcutt v. Sun Valley Co.,
117 Idaho 351, 356–57 (1990). In the case at bar, the trial court stated that
“[d]efendant contends that he was illegally arrested when he was handcuffed and
patted down. . . . The handcuffing during this investigatory stop was a reasonable
means to execute the investigatory stop.” Since this issue was directly addressed
by the trial court below, we will decide this issue on appeal.
Id. at 553 (emphasis added).  Because vindictiveness was argued to and decided by the district
court, the claim is preserved on appeal.
2. The State’s Request For A Longer Sentence Based On The Dismissed Sentencing
Enhancement Constituted A Vindictive Prosecution Because The Enhancement
Was Only Requested And Awarded As Punishment For Mr. Herrera Exercising
His Due Process Right To Challenge His Conviction
While the prosecutor ultimately dismissed the sentencing enhancement because
Mr. Herrera was again convicted of second degree murder (the firearm enhancement could not
affect the maximum sentence of life), Mr. Herrera asserts that the vindictive prosecution did not
end  when  the  charge  was  dismissed.   At  sentencing,  the  prosecutor  used  the  (now-dismissed)
sentencing enhancement to argue that the district court should increase Mr. Herrera’s sentence.
The district court, over defense counsel’s objection, did consider the enhancement and did
increase the sentence.  Mr. Herrera’s fixed sentence was increased by eight years at his second
sentencing hearing.  The prosecutor’s malicious acts of charging Mr. Herrera with a new
sentencing enhancement and arguing for additional years of incarceration pursuant to the tenor of
7the (now dismissed) firearm sentencing enhancement violated his right to due process as a
vindictive prosecution.
“Once the government has created an appearance of vindictiveness, it cannot by its own
later self-restraint cure the chilling effect of its original action.” United States v. Motley, 655
F.2d 186, 189-90 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding defendant established an appearance of vindictiveness
where he was faced with an indictment containing an enhancement provision that would take
effect only if later activated by the prosecution).
After the jury convicted Mr. Herrera of second degree murder, the court dismissed the
sentencing enhancement (Supp. Tr., p.110, Ls.14-15); yet, at sentencing, the prosecutor urged the
court to consider the fifteen-year firearm sentencing enhancement and impose an increased
penalty, to which defense counsel objected.  (Tr. (Vol. II), p.996, Ls.13-22.)  The district court
overruled the objection, and, after hearing further arguments from the prosecutor on the firearms
sentencing enhancement, asked the prosecutor to identify the code section containing the
enhancement statute, and clarified that the prosecutor was asking the district court to add that
additional time to the mandatory minimum.  (Tr. (Vol. II), p.996, L.23 – p.997, L.25.)
Thereafter, the district court sentenced Mr. Herrera to life, with thirty years fixed; a
difference of an additional eight years, fixed, from the sentence after Mr. Herrera’s first trial.4
(See Tr. (Vol. II), p.1020, Ls.1-3.)  It is clear from the prosecutor’s actions in urging the court to
consider the length and purpose of the sentencing enhancement that he was seeking an increased
sentence, despite saying earlier that he would not be asking for an increased sentence.  Where
defense counsel had initially objected to the enhancement as prosecutorial vindictiveness, and re-
asserted/maintained that objection once the enhancement was brought up as an argument to
8increase the sentence, the issue was preserved for appellate review.  The State cannot show that
the  district  court’s  error  in  overruling  the  objections,  followed by  its  apparent  consideration  of
the prosecutor’s arguments, which resulted in its ultimate decision to increase the fixed portion
of Mr. Herrera’s sentence by eight years, was harmless.
II.
The District Court Erred When It Failed To Conduct A Sufficient Inquiry Of Mr. Herrera And
His Trial Counsel Upon Mr. Herrera’s Request For Substitute Counsel, Thereby Depriving Him
Of His Right To Counsel Protected By The Sixth And Fourteenth Amendments Of The United
States Constitution, As Well As Article I, § 13 Of The Idaho Constitution
Mr. Herrera filed a written motion to replace his defense counsel.  (Limited R., pp.56-57.)
The  State  claims  that  Mr.  Herrera  failed  to  provide  a  complete  appellate  record  by  failing  to
submit  two  letters  given  to  the  trial  court  during  the  hearing  on  Mr.  Herrera’s  motion  for
substitute counsel.  (Resp. Br., pp.17-21.)  However, while defense counsel did mention a “letter
from my client indicating his position,” defense counsel was referring to the letter from
Mr. Herrera to the court that was attached to defense counsel’s Motion to Replace Defense
Attorney filed with the district court.  (Limited R., pp.56-57; Tr. (Vol. I), p.73, Ls.18-19.)  The
letter said, “Dear Honorable Judge Mitchell, I would like to request a meeting with you for the
purpose of requesting a change of lawyer please advise of procedure,” and was signed by Joseph
Herrera.   (Limited  R.,  p.57.)   And  while  an  attorney-client  communication  was  apparently
handed to the district court, the court did not retain it or rely on it in ruling on the motion, saying
it was handing the letter(s) back “because I don’t see how those go to the representation of other
Comacks.”   (See Tr.  (Vol.  I),  p.78,  Ls.9-21.)   The  district  court  clearly  did  not  consider  the
4 After  the  first  trial,  Mr.  Herrera  was  sentenced  to  life,  with  twenty-two  years  fixed.
(R., pp.279-283.)
9letter(s) between defense counsel and Mr. Herrera to be evidence of other fundamental
differences.  (Tr. (Vol. I), p.80, Ls.19-22.)
During  a  hearing  on  the  motion,  the  district  court  elicited  information  from  defense
counsel  regarding  the  basis  for  Mr.  Herrera’s  motion.   (Tr.  (Vol.  I),  p.73,  L.15  –  p.75,  L.19.)
Defense  counsel  represented  that  Mr.  Herrera  was  concerned  about  the  amount  of  time  that
defense  counsel  would  be  able  to  devote  to  his  case  between now and  the  trial.   (Tr.  (Vol.  I),
p.73, Ls.18-22.)  Defense counsel explained that he did not have sufficient time to work on the
case,  and  advised  the  court  that  was  why  he  was  asking  for  a  continuance.   (See Tr. (Vol. I),
Tr., p.73, L.18 – p.75, L.19.)  Defense counsel also told the court he and his client were having
some differences with regards to trial tactics, “but there are some fundamental differences that
I’m concerned about that I do not wish to discuss in open court nor do I think that’s appropriate,
but they are concerning.”  (Tr. (Vol. I), Tr., p.75, Ls.9-19.)  The district court spoke only to
defense counsel regarding this issue.  (Tr. (Vol. I), p.73, L.15 – p.77, L.15.)
When asked about his motion, Mr. Herrera told the court of a different conflict—one
involving defense counsel’s prior representation of Stefanie Comack’s brother and sister—before
the court told him not to interrupt.  (Tr. (Vol. I), p.77, L.21 – p.78, L.13.)  The district court did
not seek Mr. Herrera’s input again before denying the motion to replace defense attorney, saying
it trusted defense counsel to assess the possibility of any conflict of interest under the Rules of
Professional Conduct.  (Tr. (Vol. I), p.80, Ls.6-18.)  In ruling on the motion, the court found that
it did not have any evidence of the “other fundamental differences.”  (Tr. (Vol. I), p.80, L.19 –
p.81, L.9.)
The State claims that the district court “specifically rejected the claim of a conflict on the
basis of counsel’s representation” and that, “in determining whether a conflict exits, trial courts
10
are entitled to rely on representations made by counsel.”  (Resp. Br., p.20 (quoting State v.
Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 704 (2009)).  The case Severson cites for this proposition, Kaplan v.
United States, held “the court may rely on the solemn representation of a fact made by such
attorney as an officer of the court. The court may go further into the factual situation if he
desires, but is under no original or continuing obligation to do so.”  375 F.2d 895, 897 (9th Cir.
1967).  While trial courts are entitled to rely on the factual representations of counsel in
determining  whether  a  conflict  exists,  Mr.  Herrera  asserts  that  the  district  court’s  inquiry  was
insufficient, where Mr. Herrera was never permitted to speak to the court regarding the “other
fundamental differences,” and the district court only sought information as to how defense
counsel perceived the basis for the motion.
Although the State relies on Severson,  the  Idaho  Supreme  Court’s  holding  in  that  case
does  not  support  the  State’s  position.   In Severson,  the  Court  held:   “In  order  to  satisfy  the
inquiry requirement, a trial court’s examination of the potential conflict must be thorough and
searching and should be conducted on the record.”  147 Idaho at 704.  Further, the kind of
inquiry that the trial court must make is one that “might ease the defendant’s dissatisfaction,
distrust, or concern.” Id. (quoting Smith v. Lockhart, 923 F.2d 1314, 1320 (8th Cir. 1991)).
Here, like Severson, Mr. Herrera raised a timely conflict of interest objection; thus, the
court had an affirmative duty to inquire into the potential conflict. See Severson, 147 Idaho at
704.  The court failed to even ask Mr. Herrera about his motion made based on his belief that
counsel did not have sufficient time to prepare or regarding the “fundamental differences”
defense counsel identified.  (Tr. (Vol. I), p.73, L.15 – p.77, L.15.)  The court erred in failing to
gather all of the facts necessary in making the determination of whether a conflict existed.
Ultimately, by not allowing Mr. Herrera to explain his concerns regarding defense counsel’s trial
11
preparation or to speak to the “fundamental differences” that so concerned defense counsel, the
court failed to conduct an adequate inquiry.
The State asserts that the record contains “no reason to believe that Herrera could have
provided any relevant personal information related to these issues.”  (Resp. Br., p.20.)  However,
it is clear from the record that the district court stopped Mr. Herrera from speaking, and did not
allow him another opportunity to speak during the hearing.  (See Tr. (Vol. I), p.77, L.21 – p.80,
L.5.)  The district court was obligated to give Mr. Herrera a full and fair opportunity to present
the facts and reasons in support of his motion for substitute counsel. See State v. Clayton, 100
Idaho 896, 898 (1980); State v. Peck, 130 Idaho 711, 713-14 (Ct. App. 1997).  Absent a full and
fair opportunity, the reviewing court is unable to discern whether Mr. Herrera had legitimate
grounds for his request for substitute counsel. See Peck, 130 Idaho at 714.  The court was remiss
in its obligation to inquire further of Mr. Herrera regarding all potential conflicts.
III.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Overruled Mr. Herrera’s Foundation
Objections To Detective Berger’s Testimony On Gunshot Residue Analysis
Mr.  Herrera  asserts  the  district  court  abused  its  discretion  when  it  overruled  his
foundation objections to Detective Berger’s testimony on gunshot residue analysis.  Detective
Berger did not have practical experience or special knowledge that would qualify him as an
expert on gunshot residue analysis. See I.R.E. 702; State v. Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho 758, 763-64
(1993); State v. Zimmerman, 121 Idaho 971, 978 (1992).  The State has failed to meet its burden
of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the district court’s abuse of discretion was harmless.
See State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227 (2010).
12
The State  has  admitted  that  the  assertion  that  Detective  Berger  was  not  qualified  as  an
expert on the topic of gunshot residue analysis “is apparently true.”  (See Resp. Br., p.25.)
However, the State argues that Detective Berger was “testifying as an expert in deciding what
investigation to conduct.”  (Resp. Br., p.24.)  But the State actually elicited testimony from
Detective Berger on whether he had “any concerns about the limitations of gunshot residue in
terms of its ability to indicate forensically who shot the firearm” (Tr. (Vol. II), p.703, Ls.20-22),
and whether he could “describe the limitations of gunshot residue as a forensic tool” (Tr. (Vol.
II), p.704, Ls.5-6).  He testified he had concerns about the limitations of gunshot residue to
indicate  forensically  who shot  the  firearm.   (Tr.  (Vol.  II),  p.703,  L.23.)   Detective  Berger  also
testified that “when you do a gunshot residue analysis, it doesn’t quantify how much is on one
person.”5  (Tr. (Vol. II), p.704, Ls.21-23.)  The detective continued:  “It just tells you that
gunshot residue is present, so there’s really – it sometimes is difficult to determine who was the
one that fired the gun, but if they’re in close proximity, they’ll both show that they have gunshot
residue, just not a total quantity of what was on there.”  (Tr. (Vol. II), p.704, L.23 – p.705, L.3.)
5 The State does not think this testimony by Detective Berger was factually inaccurate.  (See
Resp. Br., p.22 n.5.)  To allay any confusion on the part of the State, as the Idaho Supreme Court
indicated in Warden, barium and antimony are two of the chemical elements that make up
gunshot residue. See State v. Warden, 100 Idaho 21, 24 (1979); see also State v. Babb, 125
Idaho 934, 945 (1994) (“A forensic chemist testified that the gunshot residue test measures the
presence of antimony and barium on a person’s hands.  The cartridge that killed Boone, however,
did not contain antimony and therefore left no measurable gunshot residue to test.”).
Further, contrary to the State’s argument, gunshot residue analysis, as used in recent
cases, may quantify the amount of gunshot residue found on the persons tested. See, e.g., Brief
of Respondent at 32-33, State v. Hall, 161 Idaho 413 (2017) (Nos. 40916/43874) (the State
arguing, in a case involving a 2011 homicide, that a test showing there was significantly more
gunpowder on the defendant’s hands than the alleged victim’s, and that the amount and
distribution of gunpowder on the victim’s hands was consistent with a shielding motion, was
circumstantial evidence that the alleged victim was not the aggressor).
13
Thus, Detective Berger’s testimony went beyond his training and experience as an investigator,
and the State was having him testify as an expert on gunshot residue analysis.
The State also contends that, “[e]ven to the extent the testimony was admitted to prove
the accuracy of Detective Berger’s underlying premise—that gunshot residue testing would not
have added materially to the evidence—the evidence showed Detective Berger’s expertise.”
(Resp. Br., p.24.)  The State argues it is “apparently irrelevant” that Detective Berger was not
qualified as an expert on the topic of gunshot residue analysis, because he “only testified to why,
based on his training and experience, he had decided to not send the residue samples to the state
lab for testing.”  (See Resp. Br., p.25.)
The record belies the State’s argument.  As shown above, Detective Berger testified as an
expert on gunshot residue analysis.  (See Tr. (Vol. II), p.701, L.3 – p.705, L.3.)  But the detective
did not have practical experience or special knowledge that would qualify him as an expert on
gunshot residue analysis.  He testified that he had been involved in the collection of gunshot
residue evidence (see Tr. (Vol. II), p.701, Ls.3-14, p.702, Ls.12-19), without testifying that he
had  ever  interpreted  or  analyzed  gunshot  residue.   Thus,  the  State  did  not  lay  the  required
foundation evidence showing Detective Berger was qualified as an expert on the topic of gunshot
residue analysis. See Weeks v. E. Idaho Health Servs., 143 Idaho 834, 837 (2007).  The district
court abused its discretion when it overruled Mr. Herrera’s foundation objections to Detective
Berger’s testimony on gunshot residue analysis.
The State has failed to prove that the district court’s abuse of discretion in overruling the
objections to Detective Berger’s testimony on gunshot residue analysis is harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.  The State argues the harmless error inquiry is whether, beyond a reasonable
doubt, a rational jury would have convicted the defendant even without the admission of the
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challenged evidence.  (Resp. Br., p.25 (quoting State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 669 (2010).)
However, that is the wrong standard.
As the Idaho Supreme Court held in Perry, a case decided after Johnson, “[i]f the alleged
error  was  followed  by  a  contemporaneous  objection  at  trial,  appellate  courts  shall  employ  the
harmless error test articulated in [Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967)].” See State v.
Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227 (2010).  Thus, the harmless error standard really provides that,
“[w]here the defendant meets his initial burden of showing that a violation occurred, the State
then has the burden of demonstrating to the appellate court beyond a reasonable doubt that the
constitutional violation did not contribute to the jury’s verdict.” Id.
Under the actual harmless error inquiry, the State has failed to meet its burden here.  The
State argues “the evidence was properly admitted for at least the purpose of rebutting the
inference of some improper motivation in deciding not to conduct the testing.”  (Resp. Br., p.26.)
The State contends Mr. Herrera’s counsel was advocating that “the jury could, without the
benefit of expert testimony, draw the inference that the detective was trying to avoid generating
exculpatory evidence.”  (Resp. Br., p.26.)  In that light, the State argues, “surely it was not
improper to provide evidence that Detective Berger made the decision on the basis of his training
and experience leading him to conclude that the testing would not produce evidence material to
either the prosecution or the defense.”  (Resp. Br., p.26.)  The State’s argument misses the point.
Essentially, the State argues Detective Berger’s testimony was admissible because it was
relevant.  But the detective’s testimony was inadmissible not because it was irrelevant, but
because Detective Berger was not qualified as an expert on the topic of gunshot residue analysis.
As  Mr.  Herrera  asserted  in  the  Appellant’s  Brief,  “[i]f  the  State  had  wanted  to  properly  offer
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such rebuttal, it could have presented testimony from a witness who was actually qualified as an
expert on gunshot residue analysis.”  (App. Br., p.38.)
Additionally, the State’s conclusory statements on how limiting the testimony to purposes
of rebuttal “would not have changed the trial or the arguments in any meaningful way” (see
Resp. Br., p.26), do not help meet the State’s burden here.  The State has not explained why
Detective Berger’s testimony on gunshot residue analysis, which bolstered the State’s theory of
the case, did not contribute to the conviction.  The State has failed to prove that the district
court’s  abuse  of  discretion  in  overruling  the  objections  to  Detective  Berger’s  testimony  on
gunshot residue analysis is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
IV.
The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct In Closing Arguments By Repeatedly Calling
Mr. Herrera A Liar, Misstating The Facts And Evidence, And Misstating The State’s Burden
Of Proof
1. The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct By Calling Mr. Herrera A Liar More
Than Twenty Times In Closing Arguments
The State claims that the fact that the prosecutor did not say, “Mr. Herrera is a liar”
means the prosecutor did not commit misconduct, and the appellant misrepresented the record.
(Resp. Br., p.29.)  The State claims that precedent has distinguished between challenging a
defendant’s credibility and name-calling—that telling the jury a defendant was untruthful is
different than using the word “liar.”  (Resp. Br., p.28.)  An examination of the case law cited by
the State lends no support for that theory.
In State v. Moses,  one  of  the  two  cases  cited  by  the  State,  the  Idaho  Supreme  Court
analyzed several cases in which the prosecutor argued that the defendant was lying, was a liar, or
had not told the truth when testifying.  156 Idaho 855, 872–73 (2014).  The Court’s holding in
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Moses provides no support for the State’s theory.  In Moses, the Court ultimately held that,
because “the prosecutor did not directly call the witness a liar nor expressly accuse him of
perjury;” the comment went to the strength of the evidence; thus, the prosecutor’s arguments
were not misconduct.  156 Idaho at 873.
The Moses Court said, in analyzing the Idaho Court of Appeals’ holding in State v. Kuhn,
139 Idaho 710 (Ct. App. 2003), the other case cited by the State, that “the prosecutor
‘permissibly argued that the reason there were inconsistencies in Kuhn’s testimony was because
he had lied under oath and that this was not the first time Kuhn had committed dishonest acts.’”
Moses, 156 Idaho at 873 (quoting Kuhn, 139 Idaho at 716).  But the Kuhn Court held that “the
prosecutor crossed the line of propriety when he called Kuhn ‘a liar and a thief’ and expressly
accused him of committing perjury, an independent felony.” Id. (quoting Kuhn, 139 Idaho at
716). Contrary to the State’s assertion, there is no indication that it was solely the word “liar”
that roused the Court’s ire, but that, the prosecutor’s calling the defendant both a liar and a thief,
as well as expressly accusing the defendant of committing perjury, resulted in a finding of
prosecutorial misconduct in Kuhn.
The State spends multiple pages parsing out the number of times the prosecutor said,
“Mr. Herrera is a liar” (zero times) (Resp. Br., p.29), but fails to grasp that the harm is not
dependent on whether the prosecutor uses a particular phrase. See State v. Lankford, 162 Idaho
477, ___, 399 P.3d 804, 827-28 n.7 (2017) (noting the prosecutor’s “repeated use of the term
‘liar’ and its various grammatical forms [was] troubling and ill-advised” but did not constitute
prosecutorial misconduct).  Further, the State’s same exercise in searching for and counting the
exact number of times the precise word “liar” was used by the prosecutor could have been
performed in Lankford with a similarly dismal result.  In that case the Idaho Supreme Court was
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perplexed why prosecutors continued to choose to “use the word ‘liar.’” Id. at ___, 399 P.3d at
828 n.7.  However, in Lankford, like this case, the prosecutor used derivations of the word “liar”:
1. Mark Lankford testified in this case, and there was [sic] many lies that he told you.
2. [Mark] Lied [sic]  to  Darrell  Cox  about  where  he  was  going  and  who  he  was
going to meet.
3. It shows that he’s a liar.
4. You will see Mark Lankford is a liar.
5. Well, Mark lied. He said, I don’t know anything about any murders, and I don’t
know anything about any stolen van. That was a lie.
6. So he lied to you on the stand when he talked about the kind of money he had
when he left Texas and when he came back from Texas.
7. He lied to Robert Lankford about the money he had when he left Texas.
8. He lied to Robert Lankford when he got back to Texas about why he left his car
in Idaho.
9. He lied about that. He lied about having money when he left and when he
returned.
10. He lied about going to the Frank Church River of No Return Wilderness.
11. He lied about having access to the hatchback door on the Camaro.
12. Again, another lie.
13. He lied about his use of the nightstick.
14. He basically lied about the circumstances of that nightstick.
15. He lied about having to use the restroom at McAlister [sic].
16. I find it strange that these people he allegedly says gave him an alibi defense
have never been found.... I submit that there is nobody that gave him a ride, and
that that’s a made-up story. That’s another of his lies.
We note that defense counsel initiated the theme in his opening statement by
calling the State’s witnesses liars and specifically calling Bryan a liar, stating:
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You’re going to find that a lot of the testimony that  they’re  going  to  have  from
witnesses in this case is going to be based on deception, and some of the witnesses
in this case are going to speculate. So, the State’s case is based on lies, deception,
and speculation. You’re not going to know what Bryan Lankford is going to testify
to until he actually gets upon on the stand. Bryan Lankford, by my count, has said
at least 15 to 20 different times about what happened that night. Many times under
oath in prior court proceedings, many times in sworn affidavits, many times in
letters, many times in interviews with the police and the FBI agents. He’s a liar,
and when he testifies you’re going to see that.
Id. at ___, 399 P.3d at 826–27 (emphasis added).  In Lankford, the actual word “liar” was only
used twice, but the prosecutor indicated to the jury seventeen times in closing remarks that
Mr. Lankford had not told the truth. Id.
In focusing on the precise words used by the prosecutor, the State is missing the point.  It
is not just that the prosecutor told the jury Mr. Herrera was lying, but that the prosecutor
repeatedly told the jury he was lying.  (App. Br., pp.41-43.)  The harm is in the repetition, the
fact that the prosecutor disparaged Mr. Herrera’s veracity not once, but repeatedly.  Thus, it is
not necessary to parse whether the prosecutor used “liar”, “lying”, “lied”, “misrepresented”,
“untruthful”, etc. in order to establish harm.
Similarly, there is no standard requiring that, when identifying misconduct, the appellant
is not permitted to paraphrase.  The State asserts that the appellant’s argument is based “on
manufactured quotes” (Resp. Br., p.32); however, the statements about the guilty lying, while
paraphrased for enhanced readability, still accurately characterized the prosecutor’s improper
statements.  (See App. Br., p.50.)  Further, the appellant included full sentences from each
objectionable statement to provide the utmost in clarity to the reader.  (Id.)
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2. The State Committed Prosecutorial Misconduct When The Prosecutor Misstated
The Evidence, The Law, Its Burden Of Proof, And Argued Facts Not In Evidence
a. The Prosecutor Misstated The Law And Reduced The State’s Burden Of
Proof By Arguing That Mr. Herrera Did Not Provide Sufficient Evidence
Of  His  Innocence  And By Telling  The  Jury  That  It  Had Met  Its  Burden
Simply By Proving It Was A Contact Gun Shot Wound And/Or
Mr. Herrera Lied
The State claims that the prosecutor’s “argument that evidence admitted at trial was not
evidence of innocence was proper . . ..”  (Resp. Br., p.33.)  In arguing that Mr. Herrera was
faking his emotional reaction to the shooting in an attempt to show “evidence of his innocence,”
the prosecutor misstated the trial evidence and argued facts not in evidence to the jury.  (See
Supp. Tr., p.57, Ls.12-21.)
b. The Prosecution Committed Misconduct By Misstating The Evidence
Presented At Trial And Arguing Facts Not In Evidence
i. The Prosecutor Misrepresented The Facts By Telling The Jurors
That The Methamphetamine Caused Mr. Herrera’s Agitation,
When The Testimony Had Been That Methamphetamine
Amplified Mr. Herrera’s Underlying Emotions
The prosecution’s closing remarks contained blatant misstatements of the evidence,
because at trial the testimony of Daniel Ducommun had been that when Mr. Herrera was under
the influence of methamphetamine, it amplified his underlying emotional state.  (See Tr.  (Vol.
II), p.928, L.23 – p.929, L.2; p.935, Ls.11-19.)
The State claims that the prosecutor “quite obviously” did not misrepresent this evidence
to argue that Mr. Herrera faked hysteria after the shooting and that “the argument that Herrera’s
emotional agitation did not make his claims of accident more likely was a fair comment based on
logical inferences supported by the evidence.”  (Resp. Br., p.35.)  However, the prosecutor
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argued in contravention to the evidence presented at trial.  There was no support for his theory,
other than his own speculation, and this speculation was controverted by the testimony of Daniel
Ducommun.  (Tr. (Vol. II), p.935, Ls.16-19.)  The prosecutor improperly argued both that it was
the methamphetamine that had caused Mr. Herrera to be so extremely upset after the shooting,
and that Mr. Herrera was faking his reaction in an attempt to show “evidence of his innocence.”
(Supp. Tr., p.57, Ls.12-21, p.58, Ls.11-16, p.59, Ls.10-14.)  By arguing in one breath that
Mr. Herrera was faking it, and in the next sentence arguing that the methamphetamine amplified
the already existing mental state, the prosecutor contradicted himself.  Further, his argument that
Mr. Herrera was faking his emotional reaction contradicted the only testimony at trial regarding
the effect of methamphetamine on Mr. Herrera’s state of mind.
The  State  also  posits  that  “any  lack  of  objection  was  a  tactical  choice,”  where  defense
counsel confronted the prosecutor’s statements in his closing argument.  (Resp. Br., p.35.)
However, there is certainly no strategic reason to allow the prosecutor to misrepresent the
evidence  in  its  attempt  to  prove  malice  aforethought,  the  critical  element  at  issue  in  this  case.
Under these facts, there was no strategic reason why defense counsel would not have raised an
objection to the prosecutor’s misrepresentation of evidence on perhaps the most critical issue for
the jury to resolve: whether Mr. Herrera shot Ms. Comack with malice aforethought.
ii. The Prosecutor Argued Facts Not In Evidence By Telling The
Jurors That The Chaos In The Bedroom Accounted For The Blood
On The Magazine Found By The Bed
The State asserts that “[t]here was nothing objectionable in arguing the theory that the
evidence did not exclude other possibilities for how blood got on the magazine to rebut the
defense argument that the presence of the blood was proof the magazine had been ejected prior
to the shooting.”  (Resp. Br., p.36.)  In explaining how the drop of blood came to be on top of the
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magazine, the prosecutor speculated to the jury that perhaps the magazine was popped out [of the
gun] after the EMTs arrived and other people who were “kicking stuff around.”  (Supp. Tr., p.87,
L.22 – p.88, L.3.)  The prosecutor was arguing facts not in evidence, however.  The prosecutor’s
comments were entirely speculative as no evidence of this had been adduced at trial.
It is misconduct for a prosecutor to place facts before the jury not in evidence. State v.
Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 86 (Ct. App. 2007).  In State v. Griffiths, 101 Idaho 163, 166 (1980),
abrogated on other grounds by State v. LePage, 102 Idaho 387, 396 (1981), the Idaho Supreme
Court rejected the contention that the prosecutor, by referring to facts that were not in evidence
in closing argument, may have drawn a logical inference:
[T]he statements were improper in the case at bar [because they] were
unsubstantiated by the record.  While our system of criminal justice is adversary
in nature and the prosecutor is expected to be diligent and leave no stone
unturned, he is nevertheless expected and required to be fair and has a duty to
avoid misrepresentation of the facts and unnecessarily inflammatory tactics.
Id.  In this case, the prosecutor’s suggestions that there was chaos in the bedroom and the
magazine was probably kicked around during the commotion were not supported by any facts
offered into evidence.  The prosecutor was not arguing that the evidence did not disprove that
someone had kicked the magazine (see Resp. Br., p.37), but instead was asking the jury to
speculate that the magazine was kicked around on the floor by the people in the room.  Such
speculations were unsubstantiated by the record. See Griffiths, 101 Idaho at 166.  Therefore, as
in Griffiths, the prosecutor committed misconduct by improperly drawing inferences about facts
that  were  not  in  evidence.   Mr.  Herrera  has  met  his  burden  to  show  the  errors  qualify  as
fundamental error under the Perry standard.
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V.
Even If The Above Errors Are Individually Harmless, Mr. Herrera’s Fourteenth
Amendment Right To Due Process Of Law Was Violated Because The Accumulation Of Errors
Deprived Him Of His Right To A Fair Trial
Mr. Herrera asserts that even if the Court finds that the above preserved errors were
individually harmless, the district court’s errors combined amount to cumulative error. See
State v. Martinez, 125 Idaho 445, 453 (1994); State v. Lovelass, 133 Idaho 160, 171 (Ct. App.
1999).  He asserts that the district court’s preserved errors amounted to actual errors depriving
him of a fair trial.
The  State  contends  Mr.  Herrera  has  not  shown  the  cumulative  error  doctrine  is
theoretically applicable here, because the doctrine only applies to trial errors and Mr. Herrera
only asserted one claim of objected-to trial error.  (See Resp. Br., p.38.)  However, as
demonstrated above, the vindictive prosecution and request for substitute counsel issues were
preserved for appellate review.  Also, our appellate courts have considered alleged pretrial errors
when deciding whether the cumulative error doctrine applies in a given case. See, e.g., State v.
Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 483 (2012) (discussing the district court’s partial denial of a motion to
suppress as one of the six alleged errors aggregated by the defendant, and holding the cumulative
error doctrine did not apply because the partial denial and four of the other alleged errors were
determined by the Court not to have been in error).  Thus, the cumulative error doctrine is
applicable in this case.
The State’s argument on the cumulative error doctrine is otherwise unremarkable, and no
further reply is necessary.  Mr. Herrera would therefore direct the Court’s attention to page 64 of
the Appellant’s Brief.
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VI.
The District Court Imposed A Vindictive Sentence After The Second Trial
Mr. Herrera asserts the district court imposed a vindictive sentence after the second trial.
After his first trial, the district court imposed a unified sentence of life imprisonment, with
twenty-two years fixed.  (2013 Trial Tr. (Vol. I), p.389, L.24 – p.390, L.1.)  However, after
Mr. Herrera’s second trial, the second sentencing judge, Judge Mitchell, imposed a unified
sentence of life imprisonment, with thirty years fixed.  (See Tr. (Vol. II), p.1019, L.25 – p.1020,
L.3.)
While Mr. Herrera did not raise a vindictive sentence objection before the district court,
he asserts the record shows fundamental error. See State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 228 (2010).
The totality of the circumstances demonstrates the district court imposed Mr. Herrera’s sentence
with actual vindictiveness, by increasing his sentence because he chose to exercise his right to
appeal. See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725 (1969).  Thus, the district court
violated Mr. Herrera’s unwaived constitutional right to due process. See State v. Baker, 153
Idaho 692, 695 (Ct. App. 2012).  The district court’s error in imposing a vindictive sentence
plainly exists.  The error was not harmless, because the district court basically added eight years
to the fixed term of Mr. Herrera’s sentence for exercising his right to appeal.
The State argues the district court’s comments on the lack of closure do not show a clear
constitutional violation.  (See Resp. Br., p.14.)  The State contends, “[t]he district court did
mention ‘closure’ once in the sense of an end of legal proceedings, but did so as a reason not to
impose a fixed life sentence, even though such a sentence was warranted.”  (Resp. Br., p.15
(emphasis in original).)  According to the State, “[f]ar from pinning the lack of closure on the
decision to appeal instead of accept the results of the first trial, the district court was concerned
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with the lack of closure caused by Herrera’s multiple and untruthful recitations of events
surrounding the murder.”  (Resp. Br., p.15.)
However, the district court actually stated regarding the lack of closure, “[t]he greatest
thing that impacts my decision compared to [the first sentencing judge’s] decision is a couple
more years have ticked on and we still don’t know what happened the morning of
December 25th, 2011, and that’s the way it will remain forever.”  (Tr. (Vol. II), p.1022, L.25 –
p.1023, L.4.)  When discussing whether the parties would “heal” in the future, the district court
also stated, “[a]s I said at the outset, the fact that this had to be retried by its very nature keeps
the wound open, and that’s sad.”  (Tr. (Vol. II), p.1023, Ls.10-12.)  Combined with the district
court’s other comments on the lack of closure (see Tr. (Vol. II), p.1009, L.23– p.1011, L.4,
p.1015, Ls.20-23), those remarks indicate the district court increased Mr. Herrera’s sentence
because he exercised his right to appeal and, after winning on appeal, exercised his constitutional
right to a new trial.
Thus,  the  totality  of  the  circumstances  shows  the  district  court  imposed  Mr.  Herrera’s
sentence with actual vindictiveness, violating Mr. Herrera’s unwaived right to due process.
Contrary to the State’s argument, this error in imposing a vindictive sentence plainly exists.
Additionally, the error here was not harmless.  Because Judge Mitchell essentially added eight
years  to  the  fixed  term  of  Mr.  Herrera’s  sentence,  there  was  a  reasonable  possibility  the  error
affected the outcome of the case.  Mr. Herrera has met all three prongs of fundamental error
review.  His sentence should be vacated, and the case should be remanded for resentencing.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, Mr. Herrera respectfully requests that this Court vacate
the judgment of conviction and remand his case for a new trial.  Alternatively, he asks that this
Court vacate the judgment of conviction and remand his case for a new sentencing hearing in
front of a different judge.
DATED this 15th day of February, 2018.
________/s/________________
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Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
_________/s/_______________
BEN P. MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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